Abstract. We investigate the problem of learning description logic ontologies from entailments via queries, using epistemic reasoning. We introduce a new learning model consisting of epistemic membership and example queries and show that polynomial learnability in this model coincides with polynomial learnability in Angluin's exact learning model with membership and equivalence queries. We then instantiate our learning framework to EL and show some complexity results for an epistemic extension of EL where epistemic operators can be applied over the axioms. Finally, we transfer known results for EL ontologies and its fragments to our learning model based on epistemic reasoning.
Introduction
Description logics (DL) balance expressivity and complexity of reasoning, resulting in a family of formalisms which can capture conceptual knowledge in various domains [3] . One of the most popular ontology languages, featuring polynomial time complexity of reasoning tasks such as entailment, is EL [2] , which allows conjunctions (⊓) and existential restrictions (∃) in its concept expressions but disallows negations of concepts. The following example illustrates EL ontologies (Section 4) representing knowledge of experts in different domains.
Example 1. Ana knows about Brazilian music (BM) and Nicolas is an expert in
French cuisine (FC). We can represent some parts of their knowledge as follows. Naturally, domain experts-humans, or artificial entities with complex neural networks-cannot be expected to be able to easily transfer their knowledge. However, when specific questions about the domain are posed, e.g., 'is Bossa Nova a Brazilian music style?', an expert in the domain of Brazilian music can accurately decide whether such statement holds or not. So the ontology representation of the knowledge of an expert, even though not directly accessible, can be learned via a trial and error process in which individuals or machines, generically called agents, communicate with each other, in order to learn from the other agents. We assume that the target domain of interest to be learned is represented by a logical theory formulated in an ontology language.
In computational learning theory, a classical communication protocol coming from the exact learning model [1] is based on questions of two types: membership and equivalence queries. In a learning from entailments setting [12] , these questions can be described as follows. Membership queries correspond to asking whether a certain statement formulated as a logical sentence follows from the target. Equivalence queries correspond to asking whether a certain logical theory, called hypothesis, precisely describes the target. If there are wrong or missing statements in the hypothesis, a statement illustrating the imprecision should be returned to the agent playing the role of the learner. Example 2. Assume Ana wants to learn about French cuisine. She asks Nicolas whether it follows from his knowledge that 'every crepe is a dessert', in symbols, 'does O One of the main difficulties in implementing this protocol in practice [18, page 297] comes from the putative unreasonableness of equivalence queries. Whenever a learner poses an equivalence query, the expert playing the role of an oracle needs to evaluate the whole hypothesis and decide whether or not it is equivalent to the target. If not, then the oracle returns a statement in the logical difference between the hypothesis and the target. One way out of this difficulty is hinted to us by a simple observation: during interactive communication among agents, not only domain knowledge is exchanged and acquired but also second-order knowledge, which is the knowledge of what is known by the other agents.
Example 3. When Ana and Nicolas communicate, they know what they have already told to each other. If Ana tells Nicolas that 'Buriti is a Brazilian tree' (Nicolas now knows this statement, in symbols, K Nicolas (Buriti ⊑ BrazilianTree)) and that 'Viola de Buriti is made from Buriti' (K Nicolas (ViolaBuriti ⊑ ∃madeFrom.Buriti)) she does not need to tell him that 'Viola de Buriti is made from a Brazilian tree' (as it follows that K Nicolas (ViolaBuriti ⊑ ∃madeFrom.BrazilianTree), see Section 4).
In this paper, we thus propose a new and more realistic learning model. It is based on a protocol which takes into account what is known by the agents, either because a statement was explicitly communicated or because it is a logical consequence of previous statements given during their interaction. Our protocol is based on queries of two types. The first is an epistemic version of membership queries where the oracle 'remembers' those membership queries whose reply was 'yes'. We call the second type example queries. When asked an example query, the oracle answers a statement which follows from its knowledge but does not follow from its knowledge about what the learner knows. The oracle also 'remembers' that the statements given are now known by the learner.
The first contribution of this work is the introduction of the learning model based on epistemic reasoning, which we call epistemic learning model, and an analysis of its 'power' in comparison with the exact learning model (Figure 1) . The second is an instantiation to the EL ontology language, whose polynomial learnability has been investigated in the exact learning model [11, 15, 16] .
In more details, the epistemic learning model is introduced in Section 2. We then establish in Section 3 that polynomial learnability is strictly harder in the epistemic model without (an epistemic version of) membership queries (Theorems 1 and 2). Nonetheless, it coincides with polynomial learnability in the exact learning model if both types of queries are allowed (Theorem 3). Since it is known that polynomial learnability in the exact learning model with only equivalence queries implies polynomial learnability in the classical probably approximately correct learning model (PAC) [1, 19] , it follows that polynomial learnability in the epistemic learning model with only example queries implies polynomial learnability in the PAC learning model. The same relationship holds for the case where we have (an epistemic version of) membership queries in the epistemic model and the PAC model also allows membership queries. We also show in Section 4 some complexity results for an epistemic extension of EL, which we call ELK. In particular, we show that satisfiability in ELK, which includes Boolean combinations of EL axioms, does increase the NP-completeness of propositional logic (Theorem 4). We then show that a fragment of ELK features PTime complexity for the satisfiability and entailment problems (Theorem 5), as in EL [2] . Crucially, it captures the epistemic reasoning that the agent playing the role of the oracle needs to perform. Finally, in Section 5 we transfer known results [11, 15] for EL in the exact learning model to the epistemic learning model.
Learning with epistemic reasoning
We first define the epistemic extension of a description logic L, which is often a notation variant of a fragment of first-order logic or propositional logic. The epistemic extension of L allows expressions of the form 'agent i knows some axiom of L'. We then use the epistemic extension of a logic to define a learning framework based on epistemic reasoning.
The epistemic extension of L
In the following, we formalise the epistemic extension LK of a description logic L. Our notation and definitions can be easily adapted to the case L is a (fragment of) first-order or propositional logic. Assume symbols of L are taken from pairwise disjoint and countably infinite sets of concept, role and individual names N C , N R and N I , respectively. Let A be a set of agents. An LK axiom is an expression of the form: β ::= α | K i β where α is an L formula and i ∈ A. LK formulas ϕ, ψ are expressions of the form: ϕ ::= β | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ where β is an LK axiom.
An L interpretation I = (∆ I , · I ) over a non-empty set ∆ I , called the domain, defines an interpretation function · I that maps each concept name A ∈ N C to a subset A I of ∆ I , each role name r ∈ N R to a binary relation r I on ∆ I , and each individual name a ∈ N I to an element a I ∈ ∆ I . The extension of the mapping · I from concept names to L complex concept expressions depends on the precise definition of L. We write |= L and ≡ L to denote the entailment and equivalence relations for L formulas, respectively. An LK interpretation I = (W, {R i } i∈A ) consists of a set W of L interpretations and a set of accessibility relations R i on W, one for each agent i ∈ A. We assume that the relations R i are equivalence relations. A pointed LK interpretation is a pair (I, I) where I = (W, {R i } i∈A ) is an LK interpretation and I is an element of W. The entailment relation |= LK of an LK formula ϕ in I = (W, {R i } i∈A ) pointed at I ∈ W is inductively defined (for simplicity, we may omit the subscript LK from |= LK ):
An LK formula ϕ entails an LK formula ψ, written ϕ |= ψ, iff for all pointed LK interpretations (I, I), I, I |= ϕ implies I, I |= ψ. An LK formula ϕ is equivalent to an LK formula ψ, written ϕ ≡ ψ (we may omit LK from ≡ LK ), iff ϕ |= ψ and ψ |= ϕ. We use the notion of a set of formulas and the conjunction of its elements interchangeably. The size of a formula or an interpretation X, denoted |X|, is the length of the string that represents it, where concept, role and individual names and domain elements are considered to be of length 1.
A learning model based on epistemic reasoning
We first adapt the exact learning model with membership and equivalence queries to a multi-agent setting. We then introduce the epistemic learning model in a multi-agent setting and provide complexity notions for these models.
We introduce basic notions for the definition of a learning framework and the learning problem via queries [1] , adapted to a learning from entailments setting [12] with multiple agents. A learning (from entailments) framework F is a pair (X, L), where X is a set of examples (also called domain or instance space), and L is a set of formulas of a description logic L. We say that x ∈ X is a positive example
We first provide a formal definition of the exact learning model, based on membership and equivalence queries, and then we introduce the epistemic learning model, with example and epistemic membership queries. Let F(A) be a multi-agent learning framework. Each i ∈ A aims at learning a target formula l j ∈ L j of a description logic L of each other agent j = i ∈ A by posing them queries. In this work, we introduce example queries, where an agent i ∈ A can ask an agent j ∈ A to only provide examples which are not logical consequences of what they have already communicated. Intuitively, if agent j returns x to agent i in a language L and x |= L y then agent i knows y, in symbols, K i y. Since agent j returned this example to agent i, the axiom K i y is part of the logical theory representing the knowledge of agent j, so agent j acquires knowledge of what is known by agent i as they communicate. We use example queries in combination with an epistemic version of membership queries, called K-membership queries. Given i ∈ A, assume that L i is a set of formulas of the logic L and denote by L K i the set of all formulas in the epistemic extension of L, which, by definition of LK, includes all L formulas. The target formula l i is an element of L i , however, the oracles for the example and K-membership queries may add LK formulas to l i . We denote by l k+1 i the result of updating l k i upon receiving the k-th query, where
Definition 1 (Membership query). For every i ∈ A and every
l i ∈ L i , let MEM F(A),l 1 i = l i . At all times X i is a set of examples in L (not in LK).
Definition 3 (K-membership query). For every i ∈ A and every l
be an oracle that takes as input x ∈ X i and j ∈ A, and, if
Otherwise it returns 'no' and defines l
k+1 i := l k i . The k-th K-membership query to agent i ∈ A is a call to MEM K F(A),l k i .
Definition 4 (Example query). For every i ∈ A and every l
be an oracle that takes as input some j ∈ A and outputs x ∈ X i such that l
The k-th example query to agent i ∈ A is a call to EX F(A),l k i . 1 We may write l k i for the conjunction of its elements.
An exact learning algorithm A i for F i ∈ F(A) is a deterministic algorithm that takes no input, is allowed to make queries to MEM F(A),li and EQ F(A),li (without knowing what the target l i to be learned is), and eventually halts and outputs some h ∈ L i with h ≡ L l i . An epistemic learning algorithm for F i ∈ F(A) is a deterministic algorithm that takes no input, is allowed to make queries to MEM
(without knowing what the target l 1 i to be learned is), and eventually halts after receiving 'you finished' from EX F(A),l k i . We say that F(A) is exactly learnable if there is an exact learning algorithm A i for each F i ∈ F(A) and that F(A) is polynomial query exactly learnable if each F i ∈ F(A) is exactly learnable by an algorithm A i such that at every step the sum of the sizes of the inputs to queries made by A i up to that step is bounded by a polynomial p(|l i |, |x|), where l i is the target and x ∈ X i is the largest example seen so far by A i . F(A) is polynomial time exactly learnable if each F i ∈ F(A) is exactly learnable by an algorithm A i such that at every step (we count each call to an oracle as one step of computation) of computation the time used by A i up to that step is bounded by a polynomial p(|l i |, |x|), where l i ∈ L i is the target and x ∈ X is the largest counterexample seen so far. We may also say that F(A) is learnable in O(|l i |, |x|) many steps, following the same notion of polynomial time learnability, except that the number of steps is bounded by O(|l i |, |x|).
We say that F(A) is epistemically learnable if there is an epistemic learning algorithm for each F i ∈ F(A). Polynomial query/time epistemic learnability is defined analogously, with p(|l 
Epistemic and exact polynomial learnability
In this section we confront polynomial query and polynomial time learnability in the exact and epistemic learning models. We start by considering the case where the learner is only allowed to pose one type of query. Clearly, polynomial (query/time) exact learnability with only membership queries coincides with polynomial epistemic learnability with only K-membership queries. We now analyse polynomial learnability with equivalence queries only and example queries only. Our first result is that polynomial (query/time) learnability in the epistemic learning model implies polynomial learnability in exact learning model.
Theorem 1. If a multi-agent learning framework is polynomial query (resp. time) epistemically learnable with only example queries then it is polynomial query (resp. time) exactly learnable with only equivalence queries.
Proof. Assume F(A) is polynomial query epistemically learnable with only example queries (the case of polynomial time epistemic learnability with only example queries can be similarly proved). For each F i ∈ F(A) there is an epistemic learning algorithm A i for F i with polynomial query complexity which only asks example queries. To construct an exact learning algorithm A ′ i for F i which only asks equivalence queries using A i , we define auxiliary sets s 
If EQ F(A),li returns 'yes' then algorithm A ′ i converts it into 'you finished', as expected by algorithm A i . We now argue that, for all x ∈ X i and all k ≥ 0 such that l i |= L x, we have that x is a (positive) counterexample for l i and s
and since l i does not contain LK axioms, for all x ∈ X i and all k ≥ 0, we have that l i ∧s
, where k represents the number of calls to EX F(A),l k i posed so far by A i . By definition of A i , at every step, the sum of the sizes of the inputs to queries made by A i up to that step is bounded by a polynomial p(|l i |, |x|), where l i is the target and x ∈ X i is the largest counterexample seen so far by A i . Then, for all k ≥ 0, we have that |s
Since all responses to queries are as required by A i , if A i halts after polynomially many polynomial size queries, the same happens with A ′ i , which returns a hypothesis s
The converse of Theorem 1 does not hold, as we show in the next theorem.
Theorem 2. There is a multi-agent learning framework F(A) such that F(A) is polynomial time exactly learnable with only equivalence queries but not polynomial query (so, not polynomial time) epistemically learnable with only example queries.
Proof. Consider the learning framework F = (X, L) where X is the set of propositional formulas over the variables Prop = {q, p, p
where ≡ denotes logical equivalence in propositional logic). So the target can only be a formula equivalent to p → q. Now let F(A) be the set {F i = (X, L) | i ∈ A}, with all learning frameworks are equal to F (this does not mean that the target is the same for all agents but that they are taken from the same set L). If L is a language which only contains propositional formulas equivalent to p → q, an exact learning algorithm can learn the target with only one equivalence query, passing the hypothesis {p → q} as input. However, EX F(A),{p→q} can return any of the exponentially many examples of the form p ∧ (p ℓ1 1 ∧ . . . ∧ p ℓn n ) → q, with ℓ j ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The example oracle can always provide an example which does not follow from its knowledge of what is known by the learner by taking a fresh binary sequence. Thus, there is no epistemic algorithm which can learn the target with polynomially many queries.
Interestingly, if we consider both types of queries then polynomial exact learnability coincides with polynomial epistemic learnability. 
The epistemic EL description logic
We showed in Section 3 that example queries give strictly less power to the learner than equivalence queries. We also argued, quite informally so far, that example queries are less demanding on the oracle than equivalence queries. Instead of deciding whether two ontologies are equivalent, and then providing a counterexample when it is not the case, the oracle only needs to reason about what they know about the knowledge of the learner. Yet, we did not say anything about the actual complexity of the epistemic reasoning involved in example queries. If reasoning about the knowledge of the learner is harder than evaluating the equivalence of two ontologies, then the advantage of example queries for the oracle would be moot. We show that indeed the epistemic reasoning that the oracle needs to perform is in PTime (Theorem 5). So, the oracle's benefit from example queries over equivalence queries is a net benefit. A(a) or r(a, b) with a, b ∈ N I , A ∈ N C , and r ∈ N R . An EL axiom is an inclusion or an assertion. An EL formula 2 is an expression of the form α ::= a | ¬α | α ∧ α where a is an EL axiom. An EL literal is an EL axiom or its negation. The semantics of EL is given by L interpretations I = (∆ I , · I ) as defined in Section 2.1, considering L = EL. We extend the mapping · I for EL complex concept expressions as follows:
EL: syntax, semantics, and complexity
We now define the entailment relation |= EL for EL formulas. Given an EL interpretation I and an EL axiom (which can be an inclusion or an assertion, as above) we define:
We inductively extend the relation |= EL to EL formulas as in Section 2.1: I |= EL ϕ ∧ ψ iff I |= EL ϕ and I |= EL ψ; and I |= EL ¬ϕ iff not I |= EL ϕ. In our proofs, we use the following result.
Lemma 1. Satisfiability of a conjunction of EL literals is PTime-complete [7].
We establish in Section 4.2 that reasoning about ELK formulas is NP-complete, just like reasoning about EL formulas. We note that EL(K) formulas allow arbitrary Boolean combinations of EL(K) axioms, hence the contrast with the PTime complexity of entailment from an EL ontology [2] . In Section 4.3 we show that reasoning about ELK restricted to conjunctions of literals is in PTime.
Reasoning in ELK
Here we study the complexity of the satisfiability problem in ELK. Our combination of epistemic logic and description logic is orthogonal to the work by De Giacomo et. al [9] : while our epistemic operators are over EL formulas, the epistemic operators of the mentioned work are over concepts and roles. For instance, there, KFrenchChef denotes the concept of known French chefs. Here, ELK contains formulas such as K i (FrenchChef(Soyer)) ∧ ¬K i K j (Crepe ⊑ ∃contains.Egg) indicating that agent i knows that Soyer is a French chef, but i does not know that j knows that crepes contain egg.
From the definition of the language of LK in Section 2.1, remember that the language of ELK does not admit alternating modalities; E.g., K i ¬K j A(a) is not a formula of ELK. It is rather easy to see that if there were no such syntactic restrictions, the satisfiability problem would turn out to be PSpace-complete. (We could reduce satisfiability and adapt the tableaus method of propositional S5 n [13] .) Instead, we establish that satisfiability in ELK is NP-complete.
The lower bound follows from NP-hardness for propositional logic. The following lemma is central for showing membership in NP. It is a consequence of the fact that EL and propositional logic have the polynomial size model property and that in ELK the satisfiability test can be separated into two independent tests: one for the DL dimension and one for the epistemic dimension (see [4, 7] ).
Lemma 2. ELK enjoys the polynomial size model property.
Since ELK formulas can be translated into first-order logic, for a fixed ELK formula ϕ, checking whether a polynomial size interpretation is a model of ϕ can be performed in NLogSpace. Thus, membership in NP is by the fact that, by Lemma 2, one can guess a polynomial size model (if one exists) and check that it is a model in NLogSpace ⊆ PTime.
Theorem 4. Satisfiability in ELK is NP-complete.

Reasoning in conjunctive ELK
We conclude this section considering the satisfiability problem for conjunctive ELK, defined as the fragment of ELK which only allows negations in front of EL axioms or in front of ELK axioms of the form Kα, with α a conjunction of EL literals and K a non-empty sequence of epistemic operators. Formally, conjunctive ELK formulas ϕ are expressions of the form: ϕ ::= α | β | ¬β | ϕ ∧ ϕ with β ::= K i α | K i β, and α ::= a | ¬a | α ∧ α, where a is an EL axiom.
Algorithm 1 SAT (ϕ), deciding the satisfiability of conjunctive ELK formulas
Input: A conjunctive ELK formula ϕ Output: TRUE if ϕ is satisfiable, and FALSE otherwise 1: if ω0 ∧ {ω | Kσω ∈ ϕ ♭ } is not EL satisfiable then 2:
return FALSE 3: end if 4: for ¬Kσω ∈ ϕ ♭ do 5:
if all conjunctions of EL literals in M S are not EL satisfiable then 8:
return FALSE 9:
end if 10: end for 11: return TRUE To establish the complexity of reasoning in conjunctive ELK, we use the following notation. For every non-empty sequence σ = a 1 . . . a k ∈ A + of agents, we associate a sequence K σ = K a1 . . . K a k of epistemic operators. We write β ∈ ψ if β is a conjunct occurring in ψ. We say that σ ′ ∈ A + is a subword of σ ∈ A + when σ ′ is the result of removing zero or more elements from σ (at any position of the sequence). Given a conjunctive ELK formula
where σ i ∈ A + , for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and each ω i , with 0 ≤ i ≤ m, is a conjunction of EL literals, we denote by ϕ ♭ the formula resulting from exhaustively substituting in ϕ every adjacent repetitions a . . . a of an agent a occurring in σ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, with a. (E.g., a 1 a 2 a 2 a 3 a 2 becomes a 1 a 2 a 3 a 2 .)
The following proposition is central to the correctness of Algorithm 1.
Proposition 1.
A conjunctive ELK formula ϕ is unsatisfiable iff at least one of the following properties holds:
Proposition 1 suggests that the satisfiability of conjunctive ELK formulas can be reduced to checking the satisfiability of a few conjunctions of EL literals. We are finally ready to prove the complexity of deciding whether a conjunctive ELK formula is satisfiable.
Theorem 5. Satisfiability in conjunctive ELK is PTime-complete.
Proof. Consider Algorithm 1. The conjunctive ELK formula ϕ is satisfiable iff SAT (ϕ) returns TRUE. The correctness of the algorithm follows immediately from Prop. 1. It suffices to observe that Lines 5-9 check the unsatisfiability of an EL formula ¬ω ∧ ψ where ω and ψ are two of conjunctions of EL literals (¬ω ∧ ψ is not a conjunction of EL literals, unless ω contains only one literal) by checking the unsatisfiability of as many conjunctions of EL literals ¬β ∧ ψ as there are literals β in ω. A simple analysis shows that the algorithm runs in time polynomial in the size of ϕ, with a polynomial number of calls to a procedure for checking the unsatisfiability of conjunctions of EL literals. By Lemma 1, each of these checks can be done in polynomial time. Membership in PTime follows.
Learning EL with epistemic reasoning
It is known that EL ontologies are not polynomial query exactly learnable, while the fragments of EL restricting one of the sides of inclusions to be a concept name, namely EL lhs and EL rhs , are exactly learnable in polynomial time [15] . In this section, we transfer results known for EL and its fragments to our learning model. Our results are for learning frameworks where the learning language is the same for all agents. That is, we deal with the special case of a multi-agent learning framework A) . Theorem 6 is a consequence of Theorem 3 and complexity results for EL and its fragments in the exact learning model [15] .
Theorem 6. The learning framework F(EL, A) is not polynomial query epistemically learnable. The learning frameworks F(EL lhs , A) and F(EL rhs , A) are polynomial time epistemically learnable.
The hardness result for EL holds even for the fragment of EL ontologies defined as the union of EL lhs and EL rhs , that is, in a named form where at least one of the sides of concept inclusions is a concept name, which we call EL lhs,rhs . An implementation of a learning algorithm for EL ontologies in this named form was presented by Duarte et. al [10, 11] . The algorithm is exponential in the size of the vocabulary Σ O of the ontology O (which is the set of concept/role and individual names occurring in O) and the largest concept expression C O 3 , but it is not exponential in the size of the whole ontology.
Theorem 3 is not directly applicable in this case, however, we observe that if the exact learning algorithm uses the epistemic learning model, then the outcome of each example query will be a counterexample, and so, the complexity result obtained with that algorithm is transferable to the epistemic setting. To see this, consider Algorithm 2, which is an adaptation of the exact learning algorithm for EL lhs,rhs [10, 11] . Assume F in Algorithm 2 is F (EL lhs,rhs , A) . The number of Σ O -assertions (defined as assertions with only symbols from Σ O ) is polynomial in the size of O, so, in Line 1, Algorithm 2 identifies those that occur in O using K-membership queries. It follows that all examples returned by the oracle in the 'while' loop are concept inclusions. In each iteration of the 'while' loop, the algorithm uses the examples returned by the EX F(EL lhs,rhs ,A),O k oracle to compute what is called 'left O-essential' and 'right O-essential' concept inclusions using Kmembership queries, and then updates the hypothesis with such inclusions. We Algorithm 2 Adaptation of the learning algorithm for EL lhs,rhs [11] Input: An EL terminology O given to the oracle; ΣO given to the learner Output: An EL terminology H computed by the learner such that O ≡EL H 1:
Let C ⊑ D be the returned positive example for O 4:
Compute, with MEM
Compute with MEM
Add a to H 11: end while 12: return H do not go into details of the algorithm, which is fully presented in the mentioned reference, but point out that it only adds to its hypothesis concept inclusions that follow from the target ontology O.
Since we use K-membership queries, the oracle is aware of the knowledge obtained by the learner in this way and does not return examples which follow from such entailments. With an inductive argument on the number of iterations of the main loop of the algorithm one can show that, at each iteration, if the learner asks for an example query instead of an equivalence query, the outcome will indeed be a counterexample for O and H. So the number of membership and equivalence queries is the same as the number of K-membership and example queries. Moreover, the hypothesis H computed by Algorithm 2 is equivalent to the target O (where O = O 1 , so without epistemic axioms). Our next theorem formalises the fact that the number of queries performed by the exact learning algorithm has the same bound in the epistemic learning framework. 
Theorem 7. F(EL lhs,rhs , A) is epistemically learnable in O(|Σ
O | ♯O · (|C ⊑ D|) 2 ) many steps, where ♯ O = 2 · |C O | · |Σ O | + 2, C O is
Discussion
We introduced the epistemic learning model and investigated polynomial learnability in our model, establishing that it coincides with polynomial learnability in the exact learning model, and as a consequence, we can also transfer results in our model to the PAC learning model extended with membership queries. When the learner is only allowed to pose example queries, we showed that polynomial learnability in our model in strictly harder than in the exact learning model with only equivalence queries. This suggests that example queries are less demanding for the oracle than equivalence queries. We showed that, in the EL case, the epistemic reasoning that the oracle needs to perform features PTime complexity. Our results complement previous research on polynomial learnability in the exact and PAC learning models [8] , where the authors analyse models between the exact and PAC learning models, in a learning from interpretations setting. As future work, we plan to investigate whether the implementation for EL lhs,rhs [11] could benefit from our approach, where the oracle keeps track of the knowledge passed to the learner, instead of processing the hypothesis at each iteration. Proof. For completeness of our results we show in full detail the (⇐) direction of this theorem. Now, assume F(A) is polynomial query epistemically learnable (we skip the argument for polynomial time epistemic learnability as it is similar). 
A Proofs for Section 2
MEM F(A),li behaves as it is required by algorithm A i to learn F i . If EQ F(A),li returns 'yes' then algorithm A ′ i converts it into 'you finished', as expected by algorithm A i . We now show that, for all x ∈ X i such that l i |= L x, x is a (positive) counterexample for l i and s
. By definition of A i , at every step, the sum of the sizes of the inputs to queries made by A i up to that step is bounded by a polynomial p(|l i |, |x|), where l i is the target and x ∈ X i is the largest counterexample seen so far by A i . Let s 
B Proofs for Section 4
B.1 Alternative proof of Lemma 1
We provide an alternative proof of Lemma 1. Reasoning about the satisfiability of conjunctions of EL literals can be delegated to the reasoning in EL ++ [2] . We define the function τ from the set of EL literals to the set of subsets of EL ++ CBox axioms as follows:
Now, given a non-empty set L of EL literals, we define:
The semantics of the new syntax are: ({a}) I = {a I } and (⊥) I = ∅. An analogous reduction is presented in the proof of [6, Lemma 2.1]. It is routine to show the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Let L be a non-empty set of
Clearly, τ • (L) can be computed in time polynomial in the size of L. Moreover, it has been shown in [2] that deciding the satisfiability of an EL ++ ontology can be done in polynomial time. The lemma follows.
Lemma 1. Satisfiability of a conjunction of EL literals is
PTime-complete [7] .
B.2 Deciding the satisfiability of EL formulas is NP-complete
The fact that the satisfiablity of EL formulas is NP-complete is a consequence of the fact that one can separate the satisfiability test into two independent tests: one for the DL dimension and one for the propositional dimension [4, 7] . In more details, the propositional abstraction α prop of an EL formula α is the result of replacing each EL axiom in ϕ by a propositional variable such that there is a 1 : 1 relationship between the EL axioms a occurring in α and the propositional variables p a used for the abstraction.
Given an EL formula α, we say that a propositional model M of α prop , defined as the set of variables evaluated to true in the model, is α-consistent if the following formula is satisfiable
where M is {p a | a is an EL axiom in α} \ M. We now formalise the connection between EL formulas and their propositional abstractions with consistent models, which is an adaptation of the results obtained for other EL extensions. Proposition 3. [4, 7] An EL formula α is satisfiable if, and only if, α prop is satisfiable by an α-consistent model.
To show that EL formulas enjoy the polynomial size model property, we are going to use the notion of a canonical model for sets of EL axioms [3, 17] . For completeness of our results and for convenience of the reader, we add a definition of a canonical model for a set O of EL axioms. We assume w.l.o.g. that the set O of EL axioms only contains axioms of the form r(a, b) . In the following we write O |= ∃r.B(a) meaning for all EL interpretations I, if I satisfies O then a I ∈ (∃r.B) I . Denote with N I (O) the set {a ∈ N I | a occurs in O}.
Definition 5 (Canonical model). [6][Definition 5.1] Let O be a set of EL axioms and let
∆ IO u = {c A | A ∈ N C (T ) ∪ {⊤}}. The canonical model for O is ∆ IO = N I (O) ∪ ∆ IO u , a IO = a, A IO = {a ∈ N I (O) | O |= A(a)} ∪ {c B ∈ ∆ IO u | O |= B ⊑ A}, r IO = {(a, b) | r(a, b) ∈ O} ∪ {(a, c B ) ∈ N I (O) × ∆ IO u | O |= ∃r.B(a)}∪ {(c A , c B ) ∈ ∆ IO u × ∆ IO u | O |= A ⊑ ∃r.B}, for all a ∈ N I , A ∈ N C , r ∈ N R (
in fact we only define the canonical model for concept/role/individual names occurring in O).
Given a concept C and a set O of EL axioms, the canonical model of C and O is defined in the same way, except that we add the axioms A C ⊑ C, C ⊑ A C and A C (a C ), where A C , a C is a concept and individual name, resp., used to encode that the extension of C in the model is not empty, and then transform all axioms in the normal form described above.
We now show that EL formulas enjoy the polynomial size model property.
Lemma 3. EL formulas enjoy the polynomial size model property.
Proof. Let α be an EL formula. By Proposition 3, α is satisfiable if, and only if, α prop is satisfiable by an α-consistent model. Assume α is satisfiable. Then, there is an α-consistent model M. We are going to use M to define a model for α. Since M is an α-consistent model the following formula is satisfiable
where M is as defined in Section 4. Denote by I αM the canonical model of the set of EL axioms occurring in α with p α ∈ M. For each EL axiom a of the form C ⊑ D with p a ∈ M, let I C,αM be the canonical model of C and α M . Assume that the domains of I αM and each such I C,αM are pairwise disjoint. We define I α as
One can show with an inductive argument that I α is a model of α, where we use I C,αM to satisfy the negation of EL axioms of the form C ⊑ D. The fact that I C,αM indeed violates C ⊑ D follows from the construction of I C,αM , which only adds implied concepts, and the fact that Φ M is satisfiable, meaning that D is not implied and therefore the root of I C,αM is not in D I C,αM . The fact that the negation of EL axioms a of the form A(a) and r(a, b) with a ∈ M is satisfied, follows from the construction of I α . This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.
Theorem 8.
Deciding the satisfiability of EL formulas is NP-complete.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2
We now extend the result of Theorem 8 to ELK formulas. To show that satisfiability of ELK formulas is NP-complete, we establish that ELK enjoys the polynomial size model property: if an ELK formula ϕ has a model then it has a model polynomial in |ϕ|.
Lemma 2. ELK enjoys the polynomial size model property.
Proof. Let I = (W, {R i } i∈A ) be an ELK interpretation and let I ∈ W be an EL interpretation. Let also ϕ be an ELK formula. Suppose that I, I |= ϕ. Because of Lemma 3, we can assume w.l.o.g. that each EL interpretation I ∈ W has a size polynomial in |ϕ|.
Collect in K(ϕ) the ELK axioms of the form K i α occurring in ϕ. Define K − (ϕ) = {β ∈ K(ϕ) | I, I |= β}. For every β = K β1 . . . K β k α ∈ K − (ϕ) (where k ≥ 1, and α is an EL axiom), we have I, I |= β by definition. So there are k (not necessarily distinct) ELK interpretations I β1 , . . . , I β k in W such that: (1) (I, I β1 ) ∈ R β1 ; (2) (I βi , I βi+1 ) ∈ R βi+1 for 1 ≤ i < k; (3) I, I β k |= α. Now, define W ′ = {I} ∪ {I β1 , . . . , I β k | β = K β1 . . . K β k α ∈ K − (ϕ)}. Also, for each agent i ∈ A, build the relation R To see why (i) holds, observe that by construction, W ′ contains I and at most one extra interpretation for every modal operator of each element of K − (ϕ).
Hence, the number of EL interpretations in W ′ is linear in the size of ϕ. By assumption each I ∈ W is polynomial in |ϕ|. Hence, the size of I ′ is polynomial in the size of ϕ. To establish (ii), it suffices to show that for every ELK axiom β occurring in ϕ we have I ′ , I |= β iff I, I |= β. If β is an EL axiom (not in K(ϕ)), it is immediate. If β = K β1 . . . 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 1
For every σ = a 1 . . . a k ∈ A * we note R σ = R a1 •. . .
•R a k and K σ = K a1 . . . K a k . The empty sequence is noted ǫ, and we have R ǫ = Id, where Id is the identity relation, and K ǫ ω = ω.
The two following lemmas, which are instrumental in the proof of Proposition 1, are simple consequences of well-known properties of the modal system S5 [14, p. 58].
Lemma 4. If ϕ
♭ is an ELK formula, ϕ and ϕ ♭ are equivalent.
Proof. Given an ELK interpretation (W, {R i } i∈A ), we have that R i is an equivalence relation, for every i ∈ A. In particular it is transitive and reflexive, and we have R i • R i = R i . Thus, for every pointed interpretation (I, I), for every agent i ∈ A, and for every formula ψ, we have (I, I) |= K i K i ψ iff (I, I) |= K i ψ.
Lemma 5. Let (W, {R i } i∈A ) be an ELK interpretation. For all σ ∈ A * and σ ′ ∈ A * , if σ is a subword of σ ′ then R σ ⊆ R σ ′ .
